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Summary
This report provides background on the theory and application of tax policy as
it relates to the energy sector, particularly with respect to the theory of market failure
in the energy sector and suggested policy remedies. 
Economic theory suggests that producers of energy-related minerals be taxed no
differently than non-mineral producers: Exploration and development costs and other
investments in a deposit (including geological and geophysical costs and delay
rentals) should be capitalized. In general, competitive mineral producers subject to
a pure income tax would not exploit resources as fast (compared with the rate of
exploitation under the present system of subsidies).  Over the longer term, depletion
of fossil fuels and mineral resources leads to higher real energy prices, which would
eventually promote the optimal amount of investment in energy efficiency and
alternative fuels supply. 
Under principles of neutrality of tax policy, there is no purely economic
rationale for energy taxes or tax subsidies to (1) raise revenues; (2) conserve energy
(with one exception); (3) promote alternative fuels; (4) compensate for any extra
market risk; or (5) promote, as an industrial policy, specific industries such as the
fossil fuels industry. However, even under a pure income tax, economic efficiency
suggests a system of energy taxes (in addition to the income taxes) to correct for any
environmental externalities caused by the production, importation, and use of each
fuel, and energy taxes in the form of user charges for benefits received, such as the
highway trust fund. In the case of energy conservation, market failures in the use of
energy in rental housing provide an efficiency rationale for the current gross income
exclusion for conservation subsidies provided by electric utilities. There are other
market failures in energy use that suggest efficiency standards, energy labeling, or
government-provided information, but not necessarily tax subsidies.
Tax subsidies for domestic oil production tend to stimulate domestic supply of
petroleum and reduce demand for petroleum imports. This may enhance national and
economic security in the short run, but it might damage national and economic
security in the long run as domestic energy resources are depleted faster than they
otherwise would be. The economically efficient policy to reduce import dependence
would impose a tax (or tariff) on imported petroleum based on the per-barrel estimate
of these costs (the so-called oil import “premium”). The problem of vulnerability to
embargoes and price shocks, which relates to dependence on imported oil from the
Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) and other potentially
unstable or unfriendly foreign countries, is more effectively addressed in a policy of
stockpiling oil, as is being done with the Strategic Petroleum Reserve.
In terms of environmental protection and management, energy taxes can be a
cost-effective and efficient market-based instrument, and they are economically
superior to the command and control approach. In sum, energy taxes are generally
distortional (except to correct for externalities, or when imposed as user fees for
benefits received) and regressive, and may have adverse macroeconomic
consequences, particularly sizeable taxes on energy production or oil imports.
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1 The two major tax subsidies for oil and gas were percentage depletion, and expensing of
intangible drilling costs.  Percentage depletion has been largely eliminated and expensing
has been significantly reduced.  See U.S. Senate, Tax Expenditures: Compendium of
Background Material on Individual Provisions, Committee on the Budget, Committee Print,
108th Cong, 2nd sess. (Washington, GPO, 2004), pp. 77-83.
2 In 2002 the energy tax provisions were part of comprehensive energy bill H.R. 4 (107th
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Energy Tax Policy: An Economic Analysis
Introduction
Energy tax policy involves the use of the government’s main fiscal instruments
 — primarily tax subsidies (tax credits, deductions, exemptions, and lower tax rates)
as financial incentives, and increased taxes as financial disincentives — to alter the
allocation or configuration of energy resources and thereby achieve policy objectives.
The idea of applying tax policy instruments to the energy markets is not new, but
until the 1970s energy tax policy had been little used, except to promote oil and gas
development.1 
Recent Actions in Energy Tax Policy
Recurrent energy-related problems since the 1970s — oil embargoes, oil price
and supply shocks, wide petroleum price variations and price spikes, large
geographical price disparities, tight energy supplies, rising oil import dependence, as
well as increased concern for the environment — have caused policymakers to look
toward energy taxes and subsidies with greater frequency. In a typical Congress
hundreds of bills are introduced that propose to amend energy tax policy directly, and
hundreds of others have indirect effects that either reduce costs (energy tax
incentives) or increase costs (energy taxes) in the energy industry. In the 108th
Congress, over200 such bills were introduced. 
More recently, energy tax incentives and subsidies (and also some reductions
in energy taxes) have been the dominant part of comprehensive energy policy
legislation — dominant in the sense that the changes in taxes resulting from the
incentives produce the greatest economic effects in terms of cost reductions or
increases. In the 107th and 108th Congresses, an emerging “energy crisis” —
fluctuating oil prices, spiking petroleum product prices, the California energy crisis,
spiking natural gas prices, the collapse of Enron in 2001, the northeast electricity
blackout on August 14, 2003 — led to several comprehensive energy policy reform
bills.  These bills proposed to, among other things, stimulate additional production
of oil and gas and reduce petroleum import dependence, expand electricity supply
and infrastructure, promote energy conservation and efficiency, and expand the
supply of alternative (renewable and unconventional) fuels.2 Sizeable energy tax
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Congress). H.R. 4 was dropped on November 13, 2002, due to controversy over ANWR
development and fuel economy standards. In 2003 and 2004 (the 108th Congress) these
provisions were part of H.R. 6.  On November 24, 2003, the conference report failed to
secure the necessary 60 votes to overcome a Democratic filibuster before Congress’s
adjournment for the holiday season. This represented the third attempt to pass
comprehensive energy legislation, a top priority for Republicans and for President Bush.
3 CRS Report RL32402, Energy Tax Incentives in H.R. 6: The Conference Agreement as
Compared with the House Bill and Senate Amendment, by Salvatore Lazzari.
4 See CRS Report RL30497, Suspending the Gas Tax: Analysis of S. 2285, by Salvatore
Lazzari.
subsidies (tilted more toward fossil fuel supply) were part of H.R. 6, the
comprehensive energy policy bill of the 108th Congress.  The conference version of
that bill proposed a $23.5 billion ten year energy tax cut.3
Failure of the comprehensive energy legislation caused several energy tax
incentives to expire in 2003, so the 108th Congress enacted retroactive extension of
several of the provisions as part of the Working Families Tax Relief Act of 2004
(P.L. 108-311). Those provisions, which reduced revenues by about $1.3 billion over
ten years, were enacted on  enacted on October 4, 2004.  About $5 billion in energy
tax incentives — mostly from the expansion and  liberalization of the renewable
electricity tax credit — were part of the American Jobs Creation Act of 2004 (P.L.
108-357) enacted on October 22, 2004. That leaves roughly $17 billion in tax breaks
embodied in the failed comprehensive legislation H.R. 6 (108th Congress) that have
not been enacted. 
 
Many of the energy tax incentives that have not been enacted over the past four
or five years have been repackaged as H.R. 6 (109th Congress), which the House
approved with its tax title on April 13, 2005. The tax provisions provide about $8.1
billion of energy tax cuts over ten years as compared with $23.5 billion in H.R. 6 in
the 108th Congress, and $33.5 billion in House version of H.R. 4 in the 107th. The
Senate is expected to vote on an Senate Finance Committee approved bill that
provides about  $17 billion in energy tax subsidies. This bill is tilted less toward
fossil fuel production and more toward energy conservation and alternative fuels than
the $8 billion tax incentives package in the House-passed energy bill. President
Bush’s FY2006 budget request proposed a $6.7 billion, ten-year energy tax incentives
package.  
Finally, not all of the recent actions in the area of energy tax policy have
involved tax subsidies or incentives — some have involved taxation.  For example,
during the spike in gasoline and diesel prices of spring 2000, there were several
proposals (e.g., S. 2285, 106th Congress) to suspend the motor fuels excise taxes to
relieve consumers the burden of high and spiking prices.4  More recently, there are
bills to reinstate the crude oil windfall profit tax of the 1980 to reduce the windfall
profits allegedly being earned by oil companies from high crude oil and petroleum
product prices.
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Issues Raised by Energy Policy Proposals
Proposals to amend the current federal tax treatment of the energy industry, and
to either impose energy taxes or provide tax subsidies, raise several important
economic and other public policy issues:  
! The nature and seriousness of the nation’s energy problems, and the
appropriate policy instruments to deal with them. What exactly are
the problems in U.S. energy markets? Is the problem one of
excessive demand for, and consumption of, energy? Is it insufficient
supply? Or  is it both?  Moreover, are the problems an inherent part
of the market system — that need a government solution? Or does
government interference worsen the situation? Are there market
failures, or just simply barriers that could be overcome by the market
itself if the economic variables were aligned just right?
! More specifically, what are the various problems in each of the
energy markets, the petroleum, natural gas, and electricity markets?
How serious is growing petroleum import dependence and what are
the tax policy instruments that may be effectively used to address
this problem?
! Assuming that energy tax policy instruments are the recommended
policy choice, how should the specific change in tax burdens be
achieved? Should energy tax burdens be changed by a tax credit, tax
deduction or exemption, or by reducing some energy tax rate? What
is the relative effectiveness of each of these tax subsidy instruments
in achieving policy effectiveness (the most “bang-for-the-buck”)?
! What is, and what should be the federal tax treatment of the energy
industry, including the tax treatment of investments in oil and gas
wells and coal mines, and the tax treatment of other expenses such
as exploration and development costs? Does the oil and gas industry
receive federal tax subsidies and if so how much? Do these subsidies
adversely affect the production, consumption, and importation of
energy? Do they also inhibit the development of renewable energy
(such as solar, wind, and biomass) and investments in energy
efficiency?  Should federal tax subsidies for oil and gas and other
fossil fuels be increased to stimulate exploration and supply to
address our energy problems or would budgetary resources be better
used to reduce energy demand by providing tax incentives for energy
efficiency and renewable energy?
! How should the tax code allow for depletion of mineral reserves and
other mineral production expenses. For example, should it use cost
depletion, adjusted cost depletion, percentage depletion, or complete
expensing?  How would the various tax reform proposals (for
example, a cash-flow tax or a consumption tax) affect the treatment
of the oil and gas and other energy sectors?  
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5 While there may be other factors, this report addresses those problems and solutions
grounded in economic efficiency.
! Is there an economic or policy rationale for energy taxes to raise
revenue or energy tax subsidies to encourage greater energy
conservation or increased supply of alternative fuels?  Further,
assuming the policy objective is to promote fossil fuel conservation,
would the more effective incentives target energy efficiency or the
supply of alternative (including renewable) forms of energy?
! What are the economic effects — the effects on allocational
efficiency, distribution of income, macroeconomic effects, effects on
energy supply, demand, and imports — of taxing or subsidizing
energy?
Purpose of the Report
This report provides background on the theory and application of tax policy as
it relates to the energy sector, particularly with respect to the theory of market failure
in the energy sector and the possible policy remedies. More specifically, it provides
an overview for policymakers on the types of energy tax policy interventions that are
likely to improve the functioning of energy markets, and the efficiency with which
the general economic system allocates resources (i.e.,  the general welfare).
Table 1 summarizes the market failures discussion in the report. It lists the types
of energy market failures likely to cause economic inefficiencies and the tax policy
remedy suggested by economists. It also cites examples in current law that are
consistent with this theory — energy tax provisions that enhance economic
efficiency. The text following the table discusses each of these failures in detail.5
Energy as a Commodity
 
At the outset, it is important to address the notion that there is something
inherently different about energy, or fuels from various energy resources, that
requires government intervention through the tax code.  Often energy tax proposals
are premised on such arguments, that energy is too important to be left to the
unfettered private market system.
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Table 1.  Energy Market Failures and Energy Tax Policy Remedies
Type of Market
Failure







Underpricing of  energy resources
and higher production; excessive





Emission taxes (or energy
excise taxes where feasible)









Underpricing of crude oil &
petroleum products




Oil Import Tax none
Energy R&D Manufacturers do not
undertake sufficient
R&D activities 
Unpriced benefits to free riding
firms from R&D activities
Under supply of R&D;




Tax subsidies for R&D
expenditures
Tax credit under IRC §30,





Private market fails to
provide goods that are
consumed collectively
and for which
exclusion is too costly
Under-supply, or no supply of






Benefit charges, and user
fees, but also energy taxes
and congestion pricing
Excise taxes of gasoline
and other motor fuels




have no incentive to
conserve energy
Under investment in energy
conservation items in rental





damages due to excessive
energy use
Tax incentives for landlords
or tenants for energy
efficiency investments
Exclusion of subsidy from
gross income under IRC
§136
Source: Adaptation based on Fisher, Anthony and Michael H. Rothkopf.  Market Failure and Energy Policy: The Rationale for Selective Conservation.  Energy Policy, v.17, August,
1989.
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According to economists, energy is a commodity that is produced to provide
utility to consumers or end users, and, in general, is no different than any other
economic good. Three features of energy as an economic good, however, differentiate
it from other commodities. First, most energy is derived from depletable mineral
resources: Petroleum products are derived from crude oil, natural gas resides in
depletable reservoirs or deposits (such as coal mines), and electricity is (currently)
mostly derived from coal. While this does not necessarily impede the smooth
functioning of the competitive market system, it does mean that production decisions
have to be made functioning of the competitive market system, it does mean that
production decisions have to be made in an inter-temporal framework. That raises the
important inter-generational question: Do markets optimally deplete resources over
time, or do they exploit them for short run gain at the expense of the long-term
benefits of the future generation of consumers?
The second distinguishing feature of energy is that the activities required to
produce it generate adverse environmental effects, and the process of transforming
it to do work involves combustion, which also generates pollution from emissions.
In the presence of such pollution — or externalities as discussed below — markets
generally fail to produce and use the optimal quantities of energy — they produce and
use too much energy, i.e., more than the optimal amounts that maximize social well-
being.  
Finally, energy is different from other commodities (say, e.g., food,  clothing or
housing) in that both at the micro and macroeconomic level it enters the production
process of many firms and industries in an important extent — it is a major factor of
production, just as are labor, capital, and managerial ability. This has important
implications for the macro-economy: It means that changes in energy prices,
particularly crude oil prices which are benchmarks for all energy prices, have the
potential to move the markets, and the macro-economy, in a major way.  Fluctuations
in energy prices could have major effects on the business cycle, affecting aggregate
output (GDP), employment, interest rates, and prices (i.e., inflation).  Two  examples
of this are the recession of 1974-75, which was caused by the 1973 oil embargo, and
the stagflation of the late 1970s, which was caused by the sharp run-up of crude oil
prices of the 1970s.
Neutral Income Tax Treatment of 
Fossil Fuel Producers
Under generally accepted economic and accounting principles, producers of
depletable resources (such as oil, gas, or coal), who attempt to maximize profits over
a finite stock of a resource, should be taxed in the same manner as non-energy
producers not subject to the finite resource constraint. Under a pure income tax,
depreciation deductions would be based on economic depreciation; exploration and
development drilling expenditures would be subject to cost depletion (capitalized)
instead of expensed (entirely deducted from current-year taxable income) as is
currently done; and depletion allowances would be based on the actual decline in
economic value of the mineral deposit (or approximated by indexed cost depletion
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6 An income tax is only neutral if, with equity-financed projects, the cost of capital goods
is expensed rather than depreciated.  However, as long as depreciation is consistently
applied to all sectors, then economic depreciation would not distort resource allocation
among sectors. 
7 The only exception to the efficiency of a competitive market in energy production is the
case of a production externality arising out of a common property resource. If oil and gas
reservoirs lay beneath the property of several different owners, each one has the incentive
and the legal right to open wells on his property and extract as much oil and gas as he can
before the other owners do so.  This leads to excessive production and resource depletion,
which may suggest some type of regulatory or perhaps tax policy, if the problem were of
sufficient national magnitude.  
8 See, e.g., U.S. Senate, Tax Expenditures: Compendium of Background Material on
Individual Provisions, pp. 71-89.
instead of percentage depletion).6 A neutral tax system would also generally
capitalize dry hole costs, the intangible costs of drilling unsuccessful wells, as such
expenses may be viewed as part of the cost of developing successful wells —
essentially the costs of creating an asset of value. In the event that there are no
successful wells, then a deduction for such costs in the year incurred is appropriate
under a neutral income tax system. Such an income tax would be neutral; i.e., it
would not distort resource allocation, the optimal allocation that would otherwise
result in a competitive market.7 
The current tax treatment of mineral producers — which permits expensing of
intangible drilling costs and dry hole costs, percentage rather than cost depletion for
smaller companies and for some royalty owners, exemption from passive loss
limitation rules that apply to other industries, and special tax credits and other
subsidies (such as the tax credit for oil and gas produced from marginal wells) —
differs from this neutral tax treatment in that it provides several tax subsidies for oil
and gas.8 While the magnitude and value of the subsidies in the aggregate are not
large relative to the size of the oil and gas industry, this can still lead to increased
investments in locating reserves (increased exploration), more profitable production,
and some acceleration of oil and gas production (increased  rate of extraction) and
excessively rapid depletion of the resource (i.e., they provide an unambiguous
incentive to deplete sooner rather than later).  It also would lead to a channeling of
resources into these activities that otherwise would be used for oil and gas activities
abroad or for other economic activities in the United States.  
While a change from the present tax system of tax subsidies to a neutral tax
system would have a heavy adverse effect on many smaller oil and gas companies,
particularly those that concentrate on onshore exploration, if the theory is correct, it
would be more than offset by the positive welfare effect on the country generally as
market distortions are reduced, and  resources would be allocated more efficiently.
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9 CO2 (linked to possible global warming), SO2 (linked to acid deposition, which is harmful
to rivers, streams, wildlife, and infrastructure), NOx (linked to acid rain, and an ozone
precursor, which when it reacts with volatile organic compounds creates smog, which is
linked to lung and other health problems), and mercury contamination (that pollutes lakes
rivers, and streams, and harms wildlife and human health).
Externalities and Other Market Failures, and the
Rationale for Energy Taxes and Subsidies
Perhaps more than other markets, the energy markets have characteristics which
can lead to market failure and thus a misallocation of resources. Production,
importation, and use of energy frequently generate non-market costs or benefits not
accounted for by the producers, importers, or consumers (and therefore not measured
in the marketplace) that spill over to people who are not a party to the transaction.
These spillovers — or externalities — are an energy market shortcoming because
they are uncompensated, not reflected in the equilibrium market prices for the fuel
(because without government intervention there are no economic incentives to do so).
With externalities operating, markets can fail to establish energy prices equal
to marginal costs of supply.  With inaccurate cost/price signals, a competitive free-
market system may fail to achieve the socially optimal mix — the allocationally
efficient mix — of output.  The presence of externalities does not alter the economic
argument that competitive mineral producers should be taxed under the same income
tax rules as the competitive non-mineral producers, but it does suggest either a
separate energy tax (in the case of a negative production externality, where
production and use of energy generates costs) or an energy tax subsidy (in the case
of a positive production externality, where the firm’s competitive free market output
generates benefits to third parties).
Environmental Pollution Externalities
Environmental damage is perhaps the major negative externality created as a
result of energy production and consumption activities. This consists mostly of air
pollution resulting from mining, transportation and transmission, and refining and
industrial use of oil, gas, and coal, but also includes discharges of effluents into the
water, runoff from streets, and damages to the land from mining.  For example, coal
mining can be the source of external costs such as black lung disease (from
underground mining), destruction of landscape, and water pollution from acid
drainage.  Combustion of coal in coal-fired powerplants produces large emissions of
harmful gases, fine particulate matter, and urban smog linked to a wide range of
health and environmental damages.9 The use (or combustion) of fossil fuels at the
final consumer level by households, motorists, and businesses is also a significant
source of air pollution and other environmental damages that impose uncompensated
costs on society (those not paying for the use of the fuel directly).  While much of the
air pollution is from the combustion of fossil fuels (gasoline and diesel) in
transportation, it also includes industrial and residential fuels such as natural gas,
heating oil, and coal. 
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10  Thomas Sterner, Policy Instruments for Environmental and Natural Resource
Management, Resources for the Future, 2003. 
11 Thomas A. Barthold, “Issues in the Design of Environmental Taxes,” Journal of
Economic Perspectives, v. 8, Winter 1994, pp. 133-151.
12 The excise tax on ozone-depleting chemicals was part of the Revenue Reconciliation Act
of 1989.  It was enacted primarily to meet the U.S. obligations under the Montreal Protocol
of 1987, which required the 162 signatories to reduce production and consumption of
substances that deplete the ozone layer.  The United States ratified the treaty in 1988, and
it went into effect in 1989.  In 1996, the Montreal Protocol banned production of CFC’s
altogether.   Since the tax raises revenues, it was also viewed, during the heated 1989
debates over budget reconciliation, as an option for reducing the persistent and large federal
budget deficits.
13 See CRS Report RS21935, The Black Lung Excise Tax on Coal, by Salvatore Lazzari. 
14 Renewable resources are generally thought to be less polluting than conventional fossil
fuels, but they can also harm the environment and are not pollution free.  Hydroelectric
power affects wildlife habitats, as do wind farms.  The combustion of biomass fuels
generates air emissions. The negative externalities engendered by the use of renewables
would also have to taxed, in theory.
The Emissions Tax. Most public finance and environmental economists
argue that a market-based instrument such as a tax, e.g., an emissions tax in the case
of air pollution from the combustion of fossil fuels, would be an economically
preferred instrument to correct for the market distortions caused by the pollution
externality.10  The tax would be equal to the monetary value, per unit of emissions,
of the damages to third parties, and structures, and other damages resulting from the
harmful emission. While current federal tax law does not provide an example of a
theoretically pure pollution tax, the tax on ozone-depleting chemicals resembles such
a tax.11  This tax, which is part of Internal Revenue Code (IRC) §4681 and §4682,
assesses a per-pound tax on the sale or use of a variety of chlorofluorocarbons
(CFCs) and other chemicals that have been proven to be harmful to the Earth’s ozone
layer.  The tax varies based on the degree of harm of each of the taxed chemicals,
being lowest for methyl chloroform and highest for Halon-1301.12  Another example
might be the black-lung excise tax on domestically mined coal.13 
Energy Taxes Aa Pollution Taxes.  Some have proposed energy taxes
based on the assumption that there is roughly a direct proportional relationship
between emissions and the quantity of the fuel used. This tax would be imposed on
the quantity of polluting fuel used, with rates varying directly with the amount of
external cost generated by each fuel based on estimates of the monetary value of the
harm to third parties.  Thus, it would be highest on coal, then oil, then gas, and any
non-polluting renewable energy resources such as hydropower would be either taxed
at very low rates or tax exempt, depending on the degree of environmental damage.14
Two example of such a tax are the carbon tax and the British Thermal Unit or Btu
tax. While a carbon tax in theory should be a charge on the emissions of CO2, in
practice this tax is conceived of as an energy tax on the quantity of three fossil fuels
burned — coal, petroleum, and natural gas — with the tax rate based on the carbon
content, in the ratio of 1.0 to 0.8 to 0.6 respectively.  An example of an energy tax
that approximates the effects of a theoretically pure environmental tax might be a tax
on vehicle fuel as proxy for the pure tailpipe emissions tax. This could be
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15 The current excise taxes on gasoline, diesel, and most other motor fuels include only the
user charge component and the 0.1¢/gallon Leaking Underground Storage Tank (LUST)
fund components.  For example, the 18.4¢/gallon tax on gasoline consists of the 18.3¢ user
charge that goes into the highway trust fund, and the 0.1¢ that goes into the LUST trust
fund.  Thus, there is no externality component on these fuels to correct for the cost imposed
on society from the harm caused by emissions from the combustion of the fuels.  There are
three exceptions: 4.3¢ of the taxes on diesel used by railroads and by boats on inland
waterways, and 6.8¢ of the tax on gasoline used by recreational motorboats, goes into the
general fund of the U.S. Treasury, which might be thought of as externality taxes.  On the
various components  of these taxes by fuel type, as well as the total tax rate per gallon by
fuel type, see CRS Report RS20281, Transportation Fuel Taxes and Legislative Issues, by
Bernard A. Gelb.
16 In the U.S. coal is traded in short tons (2,000 lbs.) and transported in long tons (2,240
lbs.); in Europe coal is traded in metric tons (about 2,204 lbs).
17 All prices are for the year 2003.  2003 was selected because that is the most recent year
for which average annual prices are available for each of the fuels.  Prices, which can vary
substantially between fuel grades, quality, and heat content are measured at follows:  Oil
prices are average refiner acquisition costs; natural gas prices are measured at the wellhead;
the coal price is the  average minemouth price for both underground and surface mines;
electricity prices represent the average for all uses; gasoline price is the refiner price
excluding taxes; and diesel price is the refiner price, excluding taxes, of No.2 diesel fuel.
implemented as an addition to the existing motor fuels excise tax (the taxes on
gasoline and diesel fuel).  This externality tax would be in addition to the current
excise taxes on these fuels that are mainly user charges for the benefits received from
federal highway infrastructure.15 
Clinton’s Btu Tax.  The Btu (British thermal unit) tax is a broadly-based
energy tax based on the heat content or heating potential of a fuel, or energy content
in the form of heat. The standard Btu tax — the type considered by the Congress in
the 1980s and again in 1990 and the Clinton Administration in 1993 — is a flat or
unit excise tax on all forms of energy based on the Btu. For example, one barrel of
oil has, on average, about 5.8 million Btu’s, meaning that it has 5.8 million units of
heat capable of raising one pound of water at maximum density by one degree
Fahrenheit. One short ton of coal (2,000 lbs.) contains about 22 million Btu’s, about
four times the Btu’s in one barrel of oil; one thousand cubic feet (mcf) of natural gas
contains about 1 million Btu’s, about 1/6th that of oil.16 One gallon of gasoline
contains about 125,000 Btu’s.  Thus, for example, a fixed rate Btu tax of $1.00 per
million of Btu’s would impose the following taxes:  $5.80 per barrel on oil (about
15% of the 2003 oil price), $0.97 per mcf of natural gas (about 20% of natural gas
prices paid by pipelines); $20 per ton of coal (about 114% of coal prices), and 12.5¢
per gallon of gasoline (about 11% of recent average gasoline prices).17
Oil Import Dependence 
On the eve of the 1973 oil embargo, petroleum imports supplied 33.4% of U.S.
consumption. Import dependence increased to 44.9% of consumption in 1978, and
remained relatively flat through 1992.  Since then, however, petroleum imports have
increased to over 60% of consumption.  For example, during the four week period
ending on June 3, 2005, petroleum imports were 60.7% of total supplies.  
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Table 2.  A $1 Million BTU Tax on Selected Fuels 
as % of 2003 Fuel Price 












Crude Oil 5,800,000/barrel $27.56/barrel $5.80/barrel 21%











125,000/gallon 1.16/gallon $0.125/gallon 11%
Diesel 139,000/gallon 0.94/gallon $0.139/gallon 15%
Source: All data from Monthly Energy Review, May 2005.  Coal price data are from the Energy
Information Administration’s website.
A variety of external costs may be associated with petroleum importation. These
may result when petroleum importers fail to take into account the non-market costs
of (“excessive”) dependence on imported petroleum from countries that are
politically unstable or perhaps unfriendly to the United States.  These costs are: 
! the weakened defense posture and greater military vulnerability in
the event of an embargo or supply disruption; 
! the cost of allocating greater resources to national defense in order
to maintain the level of national security preferred (compared with
the quantity that would be allocated with much lower oil imports);
and 
! the economic and social costs in terms of unemployment, inflation,
and shortages that would result from an effective oil embargo, or oil
price spikes.18  
One economically efficient policy to correct for these distortions would impose
a tax (or tariff) on imported petroleum based on the per-barrel estimate of these costs
(the so-called oil import “premium”).  Such a tax, however, would likely violate trade
agreements, and thus policymakers focus on alternative policies such as tax
incentives for domestic petroleum production, which also reduce the demand for
imported petroleum.  
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The problem of vulnerability to embargoes and price shocks, which relates to
dependence on imported oil from the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries
(OPEC) and other unstable foreign countries, is distinct from the problem of import
dependence, and might be better addressed in a policy of stockpiling oil as is being
done with the Strategic Petroleum Reserve.  
Production/Investment Risk  
Some have argued that oil price volatility might be a possible source of market
failure because it raises the risks associated with investing in oil and gas and may
result in under-investment in domestic oil and gas extraction. 
For much of the first part of the 20th Century, crude oil prices declined in real
terms and the energy markets were relatively stable. The price of oil varied during
this period, but new discoveries kept the trend of prices downward; gasoline, natural
gas, and electricity prices were also essentially declining in nominal terms during
much of this period.19 The 1973-74 Arab oil embargo against the United States
reduced oil supplies by 10-15% and oil prices more than doubled in just two years.
The 1978-79 political turmoil in Iran (and the resulting abdication of the Shah) and
the Iranian oil workers strike virtually shut off this source of oil supplies from the
world market. Iranian oil output dropped from 6 million bpd to 1.2 million bpd in
December 1978, although other OPEC producers made up Iran’s shortfalls. This was
followed by a war between Iran and Iraq, which also threatened world oil supplies
and supplies to the United States.  
Although the loss of imports to the United States was not that large (about
500,000 bpd), the threat of another supply disruption, combined with oil price
controls, caused panic buying on the part of consumers and strategic behavior on the
part of oil producers, which resulted in substantial oil price hikes. Crude oil prices
more than doubled during this period from about $10/barrel to over $24/barrel. By
1980, the official OPEC price was $36/barrel, but spot market prices reached nearly
$40/barrel. Thus, between 1970 and 1980 crude oil prices had increased from around
$1.50/barrel to around $35/barrel, an increase of over 2,200%. In 1985-86 there was
a sharp decline in oil prices, which were welcomed by consumers and beneficial to
the general economy, but which hurt the domestic oil industry (particularly upstream
operations), and oil producing regions of the United States (Texas, Louisiana,
Oklahoma, and Alaska)
From 1986-1999 oil prices averaged about $17.00 per barrel, but they  fluctuated
from between $12 and $20 per barrel. Domestic crude oil prices reached a low of
about $8/barrel in December 1998, among the lowest crude oil prices in history after
correcting for inflation.  By the summer of 1999, crude oil prices had recovered to
about $20 per barrel; and by the summer of 2000 prices peaked at well over $30 per
barrel, due largely to output reductions by OPEC, but also due to the increased energy
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demand accompanying increasing growth in the world (particularly the Asian)
economies.  
Crude prices were still high by November 2000 ($30.30/barrel), but they fell in
December after OPEC, which in 2004 produced 42% of the world’s oil, increased
production. OPEC’s prodigious oil reserves, sizeable production capacity, and cartel
-type behavior make it the swing producer, capable of affecting short-run prices in
either direction, thus making both world and domestic crude oil prices more volatile
than they otherwise would be.  During the winter of 2002-2003, there was another
crude oil price increase, this time due to the anticipated war with Iraq and political
upheaval in Venezuela and Nigeria, which are major oil producers and suppliers to
the United States. Most recently, prices have reached $60/barrel and have remained
above $50 for several months. 
Wide fluctuations in the market price of oil increase investor risk in the energy
industry (particularly for oil and gas investments), but it can also inhibit investments
in the development of alternative energy resources, both unconventional and
renewable, and in energy efficiency.  However, all prices fluctuate in a free market,
although some more than others.  And such fluctuations or risks are part of being in
business — they are not necessarily market failures. Further, if oil and gas prices
fluctuate “excessively” so that they generate unusual risks that may affect energy,
economic, or national security, the preferred approach from an economist’s point of
view would be to attempt to stabilize the price of oil — this might be done by a
variable oil import tax — rather than to provide tax subsidies.20   
Energy User Charges  
Sometimes energy taxes may act as a quasi user fee, a charge for the benefits
received by taxpayers from the provision of a public good or quasi-public good
financed from the user fee revenues.  This is the economic rationale for the gasoline
tax, which charges motorists generally in proportion to their use of the interstate
highways and highway infrastructure and uses the revenues to build and maintain that
infrastructure.  To the extent that charges approximate individual benefits received,
the tax would be efficient and equitable.21  Such taxes, however, are less precise
instruments than tolls and other benefit charges because 1) they do not actually
charge users for the marginal cost of using the infrastructure (including pavement
costs, congestion costs, and environmental costs), and 2) some of the highway trust
fund revenues — currently the revenues from 2.86¢ of the tax — are allocated for
mass transit, which means that motorists are paying to subsidize users of mass transit.
It is true that all motorists benefit from reduced congestion, but the most efficient
way of addressing this problem is to price the use of the roads to account specifically
for the congestion externality.
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Taxes vs. Tax Subsidies (Incentives)  
When the externalities or spillover effects are positive, i.e., when a market
transaction or activity confers unpriced benefits on third parties, the market system
would Under supply the commodity or activity. The classic case of positive
externalities is research and development (R&D) that leads to technological
innovations.  An individual firm that undertakes R&D activities obviously incurs the
cost of these efforts and activities, but it typically does not obtain the entire return,
some of which accrues to other firms (free riders) that do not undertake these
expenditures.  Energy R&D engenders similar spillover effects, whether it is from
research in clean-coal technologies, photovoltaic solar systems, electric cars, fuel
cells, or energy efficiency technologies. The manufacturer of building equipment and
energy-using technologies may not have adequate incentives to support sufficient
levels of research to improve building or equipment efficiency because some of the
gains may accrue to firms not undertaking the expenditures.  
In cases of positive externalities, the social return exceeds the purely private
returns to individual companies, and from an economic perspective a subsidy is
warranted to bring the marginal costs of production in balance with the marginal
social benefit (private benefits + external benefits, at the margin).  Such support has
produced major innovations in the energy efficiency of various energy using-
equipment such as heat pumps and resulted in significant reductions in the price of
generating alternative energy such as photovoltaic solar energy.  Such is the rationale
for the present tax subsidies for such technologies  (the tax credit, and expensing
treatment of R&D expenditures) as well as government expenditures for energy
R&D.   
The amount of the subsidy on the product or activity would be the value of the
benefits per unit of the commodity traded — proportional to the spillover —
conferred on the source of the external benefits.  Energy R&D is unlikely, however,
to require a differential subsidy — above and beyond that provided for non-energy
R&D — since there is no a priori reason to believe that the external benefits from
energy R&D are higher or lower than for non-energy R&D.
Energy Tax Subsidies as an Industrial Policy  
Many of the incentives or subsidies that are proposed for oil and gas as well as
for alternative fuels appear to be based on the supposition that government ought to
support business, particularly when times are bad.  Such, for example, was the
rationale for numerous proposals to help the domestic oil industry, particularly small
producers, that were harmed by the downward trend in crude oil prices since the mid-
1980s, and the sharp drop in those prices during 1998-99. 
The low prices of 1998-99 fostered proposals for economic relief through the
tax code for the particularly small independent drillers and producers, which were the
harbingers of current comprehensive energy bills. The 1998-99 proposals mainly
focused on production tax credits for marginal or stripper oil, which were later
included in the American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, P.L. 108-357, enacted on
October 22, 2004 (also referred to as the “jobs bill”).  A $500 million package of loan
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guarantees for small independent oil and gas producers, which became law (P.L. 106-
51) in August 1999, was enacted in lieu of the tax incentives.
The Economic Justification for Tax Subsidies as an Industrial
Policy.  There is no purely economic justification, either on efficiency or
stabilization grounds, for using tax subsidies as an industrial or employment policy
to help a distressed industry — including the conventional fossil fuels industry and
the alternative fuels industry.  An industrial policy is usually the context  for
government subsidies to businesses whenever those businesses experience sustained
or sharp economic hardships, due generally to any cause but targeted toward
industries experiencing declining prices, suffering cost/price squeezes, or competition
from foreign firms.  
Economic theory does recognize that market failures such as barriers to entry
into markets, and other failures that inhibit market competition, may be used to
justify government intervention. Intervention may also be justified by “externalities”
or spillovers, previously discussed. The U.S. and world crude oil markets are
certainly not perfectly competitive, as there are elements of market power particularly
in the world oil market, which is significantly affected by the OPEC. But these
markets are certainly more competitive today then they have ever been. It does not
appear that the imperfections may be exhibited by either the U.S. or world crude oil
markets, that they would justify tax subsidies to oil and gas producers on grounds of
economic efficiency. Depressed or volatile oil prices (or any other price) are not
market failures. An industrial policy is an inefficient way to stimulate aggregate
employment. 
The Social Rate of Discount and Market Failures
Some have argued that the competitive free-market system may establish
interest rates (or private discount rates) that are too high, which may lead producers
to discount the future excessively and therefore deplete energy and other minerals too
rapidly.  Rapid depletion increases environmental damages for the current generation
and reduces economic living standards (real income) for future generations who
would have a lower capital stock.  
In general, economic theory and empirical evidence refute the proposition that
competitive markets lead to excessive exploitation of mineral resources. Capital
markets are also believed to function fairly close to competition, and there is no
market failure that results in interest rates higher than the competitive rates.  Even if
the argument were true, however, it would at the very least suggest policies to lower
interest rates, elimination of all federal tax subsidies for nonrenewable resources, and
the imposition of a federal severance tax to reduce production of these resources. 
Energy Conservation and Energy Efficiency
Energy taxes on producers and consumers that factor in the external costs of
energy use, such as air pollution, would contribute significantly to energy
conservation by raising energy prices and reducing the demand for energy. The
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demand for energy would decline both through a direct demand response, i.e.,
curbing energy use through reductions in output, service, or utility levels (e.g., by
reducing the number of miles driven, indoor temperatures during winter by turning
down the thermostat, etc.) and through substitution of more energy-efficient for less
energy-efficient technologies. This would be true for all energy that generates
external costs, but is particularly true for fossil fuels, whose external costs are
generally greater than for other energy types.  
However, energy taxes to encourage conservation should be unnecessary on
economic grounds because over the longer term, as depletion gradually diminishes
the stock of exhaustible energy resources (such as petroleum), conventional energy
prices would be expected to increase in real terms, all else (such as technological
advancements and innovations, and the degree of recycling) remaining the same.22
As a result, more of the energy efficient technologies would become profitable and
investment in energy-efficient technologies would increase (for example, more
energy efficient housing, automobiles with higher miles per gallon, and more energy
efficient industrial equipment such as boilers).23   
 Thus, aside from energy taxes or subsidies to correct for energy production and
consumption externalities, and aside from possible user charges, economists
generally argue there is no economic justification for additional taxes or tax subsidies
to encourage greater energy conservation, or energy efficiency.  This is because there
is generally no market failure in energy use (notwithstanding the environmental
externalities discussed above, or the exceptions discussed below) or in investment
in energy-using technologies — at either the household or business level — that
requires such tax subsidies. Just as the competitive market system, corrected for
externalities, automatically and efficiently leads to the optimal production and use
of energy resources, it also leads to the optimal amount of investment in energy
efficiency technologies.  All this is done without the effect of subsidies, in terms of
revenue losses and allocational distortions, which reduce aggregate output and the
general welfare.  
There are four market failures in energy use, however, that may be an economic
justification for government intervention, but only one is a rationale for certain types
of conservation tax subsidies. In rental housing, the tenant and the landlord lack
strong financial incentives to invest in energy conservation equipment and materials,
even when the benefits clearly outweigh the costs, because the benefits from such
conservation may not entirely accrue to the party undertaking the energy-saving
expenditure and effort. Builders and buyers may also lack sufficient information, a
problem which is also discussed below.
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As a general rule, tenants are not going to improve the energy efficiency of a
residence that does not belong to them, even if the unit is metered.  They might if the
rate of return (or payback) is sufficiently large, but most tenants do not occupy rental
housing long enough to reap the full benefits of the energy conservation investments.
Part of the problem is also that it is not always easy to calculate the energy savings
potential (hence, rates of return) from various retrofitting investments.  Landlords
may not be able to control the energy consumption habits of renters to sufficiently
recover the full cost of the energy conservation expenditures, regardless of whether
the units are individually metered or not. If the units are individually metered, then
the landlord would not undertake such investments since all the benefits therefrom
would accrue to the renters, unless a landlord could charge higher rents on
apartments with lower utility costs.  If the units are not individually metered, but
under centralized control, the benefits of conservation measures may accrue largely
to the landlord, but even here the tenants may have sufficient control over energy use
to subvert the accrual of any gains to the landlord.  In such cases, from the landlord’s
perspective, it may be easier and cheaper to forego the conservation investments and
simply pass on energy costs as part of the rents.  Individual metering can be quite
costly and while it may reduce some of the distortions, it is not likely to completely
eliminate these, because even if the landlord can charge higher rents, he may not be
able to recover the costs of energy conservation efforts or investments.  
These market failures may lead to Under investment in conservation measures
in rental housing and provide the economic rationale for Internal Revenue Code
(IRC) §136, which allows the value of any energy conservation subsidy provided by
electric utilities to households to be excluded from gross income.  Without such
explicit exclusion, such subsidies would be treated as gross income and subject to
tax.  This exclusion, however, applies to both owner-occupied and rental housing,
and to a limited extent to business conservation subsidies.
There are other types of market failures in energy use that may suggest either
minimum efficiency standards or government-provided information such as energy
efficiency labels.  As suggested above, many homeowners may not know the precise
payback or rate of return of a particular energy-efficiency enhancing investment, or
may not know how to calculate it. This may be a particularly serious problem for
older homes, which are less energy efficient then newer models — those built since
the energy crisis of the 1970s.  This market failure problem suggests government-
provided information as a solution, however, rather than tax subsidies. 
A third energy market failure arises out of asymmetric information between
energy consumers and manufacturers of energy efficient equipment. The energy
consumer may have little incentive to become fully informed about the energy
efficiency of a particular energy-using or -saving item, while the producer, who has
complete and accurate information, doesn’t have the incentive to produce a higher
priced and more energy efficient product, since it is might be more difficult to market
and sell such a product.  Thus, while a particular energy-saving device may have a
high rate of return, the market may not provide it. This problem suggests either
government mandated efficiency standards or labeling as is currently being done with
appliance energy labels and fuel economy labels.  
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Finally, although capital markets are generally competitive and efficient, low-
income consumers may have difficulty acquiring loans for conservation investments,
even when such investments are profitable (the present value of the energy
expenditure savings is greater than the capital costs).  This suggests that low or zero
interest rate loans for low income consumers or even weatherization grants could
address the problem. 
Renewable vs. Conventional Fuels
The higher energy prices that would result from taxes imposed on conventional
energy to address external costs would also lead to more investment to increase the
supply of alternative fuels, which would, in time, lead to even more conservation of
(reduced demand for) conventional fuels. Over the longer term, the supply of these
alternatives would tend to increase as depletion of conventional energy raises its real
price. Even without increases in conventional fuel prices, alternative energy could
gain a price advantage through future technological advances.
As in the case of energy conservation, there are no externalities or market
failures that cause under-investment in alternative energy technologies and under-
supply of alternative fuels. The private market system works effectively and
efficiently in developing any form of energy and its technologies if there are
sufficient profit incentives, i.e., if the rate of return on such investments is above the
opportunity cost of capital. Moreover, the market ensures that the least-cost, most
efficient alternatives become commercialized first, and the market adjusts quickly
and efficiently to the changing dynamics of the marketplace.   
In general, in cases where alternative fuels have difficulty penetrating the
market, it is because they cannot be competitively priced, relative to conventional
fuels, generally because either oil prices are too low, capital costs of alternative fuels
technologies are too high, or both. To illustrate, compare the estimated 30-year
levelized costs, per unit of electrical output, and the capital costs of various
technologies for producing electricity using conventional fuels (primarily coal, but
also natural gas) and alternative fuels such as biomass and wind energy systems.24
Electric utilities can upgrade existing coal-fired units at a cost of 2.0¢/kWh, or they
can invest in the latest efficient and cleaner technology (the advanced combined-
cycle natural gas unit) at a cost of  about 3.5¢/KWh. These are substantially lower
than some estimates of the cost/KWh of the following energy alternatives: 15.0¢ for
photovoltaics; 5-10¢ for small hydroelectric; 6-8¢ for solar thermal power; 4-7¢ for
wind power; and 4-6¢ for biomass.  Much of these cost differences are due to the
significantly higher capital costs of generating electricity with alternative energy
resources ($7,000/KW for photovoltaics, $1,500/KW for biomass, $1,000/KW for
wind) as compared with conventional fuels ($400/KW for the combined cycle natural
gas and $200/KW for retrofitting existing coal-fired units).25  
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Volatile oil prices can increase investor risk and inhibit the development of
alternative, renewable (solar, wind, etc.), and unconventional resources. This is
because oil is the benchmark energy resource that sets the long-term price (and
therefore influences the profitability) of all other fuels.  Hypothetically, if alternative
fuels would be profitable at oil prices of $40 per barrel, but prices fluctuate between
$20 per barrel and $60 per barrel, there will generally be less investment in
renewable and unconventional resources than if the price were stable at $40 every
year.  However, as discussed before, tax subsidies for alternative fuels are a costly
and inefficient policy to correct for such risks.  
Does Oil and Gas Have a Competitive Advantage?
It is sometimes argued that alternative fuels such as solar and wind energy and
other ‘renewables’ are at a competitive disadvantage, vis-a-vis fossil fuels, because
of the production tax subsidies — expensing, percentage depletion, and others —
bestowed on the oil and gas industry over decades, and that this justifies
countervailing subsidies to alternative fuels to “level the playing field.”  Historically
the large tax subsidies for oil and gas — which totaled tens of billions of dollars to
date — helped keep domestic and world oil prices low, encouraged consumption, and
discouraged the development of alternatives fuels.  Past subsidies, however, do not
determine the economic viability of alternative fuels at the present time — past
subsidies do not significantly affect the current competitive structure of the energy
market.  
As to the current oil and gas tax subsidies, there are two reasons that these
subsidies are unlikely to reduce the competitiveness of alternative fuels. First, current
oil and gas tax subsidies are smaller than they have been historically. Indeed, some
evidence suggests that current oil and gas tax subsidies are smaller, in relationship
to industry size, than the tax subsidies for alternative fuels.26  Second, and more
importantly, the structure of the world crude oil market since the 1970s has changed
in a fundamental but critical way: Crude oil prices have since the 1970s been
determined in a world oil market, a market which has become more competitive and
in which U.S. domestic producers are price takers.  In such a market, the subsidies
for oil and gas have little if any effect on the market price of crude oil, hence little,
if any, effect on the competitiveness of alternative fuels. 
Energy Taxes to Increase Revenues 
and Reduce Deficits
   
Energy taxes have also been proposed for primarily fiscal reasons — to generate
revenues for deficit reduction.  The first federal gasoline tax was enacted in 1932 (at
1¢/gal. for gasoline and 2¢ for diesel fuel) as a way of cushioning federal deficits,
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which were mounting with the Great Depression.  Energy tax proposals for deficit
reduction were commonplace during the 1982-1993 period as budget deficits
mounted due to huge tax cuts under the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 (P.L.
97-34) and the nation experienced reduced inflation, economic recession, defense
buildups, and the federal inability to control spending.  Several energy taxes were
proposed at that time: 
! an increase in the excise taxes on gasoline, diesel, and other motor
fuels; 
! a sizeable tax on imported oil (in addition to the customs duties that
are already imposed on imported petroleum); 
! a tax on both imported and domestically produced crude oil; and
! a broadly-based or general energy tax on all or most types of energy
consumption, either based on the heat content of the fuel (Btu tax),
the carbon content of the fuel (the carbon tax), or on the sales price
(the ad valorem energy tax).   
Eventually, only the tax on gasoline and other motor fuels was increased (by 5¢ in
1982, 5¢ in 1990, and by 4.3¢ in 1993).
As a general economic principle there is no distinct fiscal rationale for a federal
energy tax as a source of general fund financing of federal activities or for deficit
reduction.  Economic principles suggest federal programs ought to be financed by
general income or general consumption taxes. Such taxes, however, while less
distortive and more equitable than energy taxes and other selective excise taxes (or
differential commodity taxes) are also distortional. Income taxes, for instance, distort
the choice between work and leisure by raising the price of work relative to the price
of leisure, which tends to increase leisure and reduce work.  Income taxes also distort
the choice between consuming and saving for the future by raising the price of
consuming in the future (i.e., saving).  
If an efficiency enhancing tax, such as an externality correcting energy tax,
could be substituted for a distortional tax in a revenue neutral way, not only would
there be no budgetary effect, but there would be a gain in efficiency (e.g., a reduction
in pollution to the environment).27  In some cases, the revenue gain — hence the
possible efficiency gain — could be substantial.  For example, a $30/ton tax on
carbon emissions, which would roughly stabilize carbon emissions at their 2000
levels, would generate about $40 billion annually; a $100 per ton tax could generate
as much as $100 billion annually.28  
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Another example is the gasoline tax. Currently, the burden of the gasoline tax
is largely offset or counterbalanced by the benefits received from highways and
infrastructure financed from the tax.  This means that under current law, and indeed
since the inception of the gasoline tax, there has never been a tax on gasoline that
accounts for the external costs of driving: the environmental costs of oil production
and refining, the environmental costs from tailpipe emissions, the costs of oil import
dependence, and the road congestion. A policy to impose a tax on gasoline as a
substitute for a distorting income tax would not only make drivers pay for the
external costs of driving, it would reduce income tax distortions, and enhance
economic efficiency. Moreover, higher gasoline prices would promote petroleum
conservation, reduce air pollution, and carbon emissions substantially, and would
promote the development of alternative fuels without a large cost, in terms of reduced
revenues from subsidization, to the federal budgetary. However, gasoline taxes of
this magnitude could be, unless phased-in gradually, a significant shock to the
economy.   
Energy Taxes vs. Regulation to Achieve
Environmental Policy Goals 
Energy taxes and subsidies, when used to correct for externalities and other
market failures, offer an efficient alternative or supplement to regulations as an
instrument of environmental policy. Regulations prescribe the type of technology or
equipment for environmental protection, the maximum permitted rate of emission for
a particular pollutant, or a minimum energy-efficiency standard, and  are part of the
“command-and-control” approach to environmental protection.  Regulations, such
as standards, give policymakers more assurance that environmental policy goals will
be achieved regardless of cost, but are often more costly and less economically
efficient than taxes or tradeable emissions permits.   
To illustrate the fundamental reason why a standard would be economically less
efficient than the tax, consider a regulation that prescribes that electric utility
generators must be at least 45% energy-efficient as a way of conserving energy and
reducing power plant emissions.  That is, every fossil-fuel-fired generator in use
would have to have an efficiency rate of 45%.  In response to the standard, and given
current economics of alternative generation strategies, most utilities would invest in
the advanced combined-cycle natural gas system (ACCNG), which is the cheapest
and most energy efficient technology, with an efficiency rate close to 50%.
Subjecting all firms to the same regulatory standard essentially ensures the same
behavioral response regardless of differences in the marginal costs of reducing air
emissions.  But, while the ACCNG system is the least-costly technology among those
feasible technologies that meet the 45% energy efficiency standard, it may not be the
least-cost energy conservation or air pollution control strategy for every single utility,
in every single plant, every single generating unit, and for each of the various types
of emissions.   
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Intuition suggests, and many studies have confirmed, that the marginal costs of
pollution control (marginal abatement costs) vary for each type of pollutant and with
the type of technology that utilities use. With the regulation as described, no account
would be taken of the differences among utilities, plants, and generating units in their
capacity to reduce emissions. Yet, because of differences in site characteristics,
design, and utilization rate, current generating units differ significantly with respect
to the difficulty (or ease) and the cost of reducing emissions.  As a result,  those firms
with the greater pollution abatement costs would have to undertake the same level
of abatement as those with lower marginal abatement costs. 
Because of these cost differences, there are many different strategies and options
that utilities might use to reduce exhaust emissions from power plants.  For example,
some utilities might just reduce output, others might invest in pollution control
equipment, and still others might replace their coal-fired units with advanced
technologies.  If there are enough differences among utilities and their marginal
abatement costs, then the total costs of reducing emissions with the regulatory
standard would be greater (less efficient) than any of the market-based approaches.
In contrast, a tax would provide the incentive for each polluter to reduce
pollution in the least costly way — up to the point at which the tax just equals the
marginal abatement costs.  In the above illustration, the utility with the lower
marginal abatement costs of reducing pollution would undertake more pollution
abatement than the utility with higher marginal abatement costs.  In that way the total
cost of abatement would be minimized.  Tax revenues could be used to compensate
the parties that are harmed by the emissions.  The total costs of emissions control
from utilities would be much lower if utilities were permitted to use various
technologies and control options that are the least cost for that particular utility, that
particular plant, and that particular generating unit, to address different emissions,
which is how a tax would work.  By using a tax instead of a standard, all those anti-
pollution activities that cost less than the tax will, in theory, be undertaken. 
Taxes or Tradeable Emissions Permits
An alternative market-based approach for environmental protection — an
efficient alternative to emissions taxes or their practical equivalent, energy taxes —
is the tradeable emission permit or allowance, also known as “pollution rights,”
“cap-and-trade,” or marketable pollution permits. Under this approach, the
government (the Congress and the environmental authorities) requires each emitter
of a particular pollutant to have a legal permit to emit a fixed amount of that
pollutant. The authorities establish a target level for aggregate emissions of a
particular pollutant (say so many hundreds of thousand of tons per year), and the
pollution equivalence of the tradeable permits (one permit equals one ton of X
pollutant).  It also allows these permits to be traded in the marketplace among source
emitters (or among anyone), who can either buy and use them (if the costs of a permit
are less than the marginal abatement costs), save them for future use (if they expect
marginal abatement costs to rise above the cost of each permit) or sell them (if their
marginal abatement costs per ton are less than the price of a permit).  The idea
underlying this approach is that it achieves any given level of pollution at lower
costs, and is thus economically efficient.  Those firms with relatively low marginal
abatement costs will choose abatement over permits; those with relatively high
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abatement costs will choose to purchase permits rather than control pollution.  The
aggregate level of pollution is fixed, however.
While in theory allowances are equivalent to an emissions tax — and thus also
more efficient than standards — in practice there are differences that may make
tradeable permits generally more appealing to the policymaker in certain situations
while the emissions tax approach is more appealing in others.29 First, tradeable
permits fix the level of aggregate pollution and let the price adjust, whereas the tax
fixes the price (the statutory tax rate per unit) and lets the quantity of pollutant (or its
equivalent amount of energy) adjust. Thus, tradeable permits appear to give the
authorities greater certainty of control over the level of pollution, and therefore
control over air and water quality. Tradable permits are considered by many a
superior instrument when pollution is reaching some critical level and the
government needs to control the quantity of the emissions.  Another advantage of
tradeable permits is that they avoid the information problem associated with
emissions taxes, which would require authorities to know both the marginal external
costs (the monetary value of the damages) and the marginal abatement costs per unit
of pollution.  This information, none of which is required with tradeable permits, is
difficult and costly to estimate and in some cases not available at all.  None of this
is required with tradeable permits.  Finally, taxes may be eroded by inflation and
affected by the entry and exit of firms.  This is not a problem for tradeable permits.
Under a tradeable permit system the authorities must establish a system for
monitoring the emissions of the polluter.  This is relatively simple when the number
of polluters is relatively small in relationship to the magnitude of the emissions,
which is the case with SO2 emitted by electric utilities.  As the number of polluters
increases, the complexity of emissions monitoring and program administration
increases exponentially, which raises the transactions costs of the permit system to
such levels that it would no longer make tradeable permits efficient.  Such is the case
with CO2 emissions which have millions of sources.  In such a case an emissions tax
is more appealing.
The economic efficiency advantages of market-based approaches to
environmental protection are suggested by the documented evidence on the success
of the tradeable permit system — mandated by title IV of the Clean Air Act — in
controlling emissions of sulfur dioxide (SO2) by electric utilities while lowering
compliance costs as compared to initial or regulatory costs.30 According to the
Environmental Protection Agency: “Both the Acid Rain Program’s rate-based
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approach to NOx reduction and cap-and-trade approach to SO2 reduction have been
very successful.”31  Tradable permits are also being discussed as an instrument of
controlling greenhouse gases worldwide, part of an international framework to
control emissions of CO2  and other greenhouse gases. 
The Economic Effects of Energy Taxes 
The level of, and changes to, energy taxes and subsidies can affect energy prices
and output, economic growth rates, income distribution, and international trade.
Thus, they can be a very powerful energy and economic policy instrument.
Efficiency Effects  
As was discussed above, energy taxes and subsidies can be a useful instrument
to correct for pre-existing distortions in the allocation of resources and
simultaneously generate tax revenues, if they are imposed on activities or
commodities such as energy resources whose production and use generate external
costs, or if they are imposed as user fees for the services of a public good.  Otherwise,
selective energy excise taxes for either greater production, improved technical energy
efficiency, or increased supply of alternative fuels reduce the efficiency of the
economy.  Reduced efficiency  implies reduced output and lower standards of living.
Distributional Effects
With respect to energy taxes on supply, there is generally no separate equity case
that can be made for taxing energy at a higher rate than other commodities.  Due to
nonrenewable resources’ finite stock, economic rents (also called scarcity rents) are
created when these resources are produced.  Under competitive conditions such rents
would be expected to rise at the rate of interest so as to achieve asset or capital
market equilibrium. Such rents are not excessive under competitive supply and need
not be taxed away on equity grounds.32 Energy taxes on consumers (e.g., gasoline
taxes, oil taxes, or general energy taxes) also frequently have negative distributional
consequences because the incidence of such taxes often falls disproportionately on
lower incomes. Finally, energy tax subsidies frequently also have adverse
distributional effects. One example — there are others — is the income tax credit
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(the §29 tax credit) for non-conventional energy resources, which in addition to
distorting resource allocation, losing tax revenues, and not reducing oil import
dependence (since it has basically increased the supply of methane gas rather than
alternatives to petroleum) is also questionable on tax equity grounds. Supporters of
the credit contend that it encourages domestic energy production, however, and could
become more important in the future.  They also note that domestic methane resulting
from the credits helps offset the growing U.S. need for natural gas imports.
Macroeconomic Effects  
Increases in energy taxes are basically a contractionary fiscal policy that would
tend to reduce aggregate output and employment, and produce a temporary increase
in the rate of inflation above the baseline. Increases in taxes on final energy demand,
such as a hike in the gasoline tax, tend to be (dollar for dollar) less contractionary
than energy taxes on industry (such as an oil tax) although these, too, reduce
household income, consumer spending, and to some extent business costs and profits.
Sizeable taxes on oil increase the price of all energy and can trigger relatively large
cutbacks in industrial energy use and energy used as inputs into production.  Such
taxes, including an oil import tax, can produce macroeconomic effects akin to an oil
price shock, resulting in a temporary but sharp slowdown in the economy’s growth.
